Lebanese sanctities to counter a potential civil war:
Constitutional Reforms and alternation of Powers between the six major denominations

Now that Syria’s "sanctities" have collapsed along with its design in Lebanon, isn’t it time for Lebanese sanctities to lay the foundations of a true civil peace that would protect this Nation from booby-trapped, poisoned and imported design?

By Lebanese sanctities I mean the constitutional guarantees that preserve sectarian diversity and balance between institutions without failing to promote national identity in every Lebanese, regardless of their religious affiliation confession, clan or place of birth.

It is true that the Taif Accord has put an end to Lebanon’s Civil War. However, it entailed many constitutional flaws and shortcomings that happened to paralyze the institutions on the one hand and on the other it was implemented in a partial, selective and temperamental way which distorted its content and shook its consensual foundations.

Consequently, if the Lebanese are serious about coexisting on the basis of equality and regaining their sense of national belonging, they have to prove it by forming a committee of high-ranking lawmakers that would address the Taif’s flaws without tampering with its substance. This committee would also have to present these amendments to the first House freely elected on the basis of a fair and modern law.

One of the major issues that shouldn’t be disregarded is to reconsider the prerogatives of the three powers - not to limit it but rather to facilitate the establishment of a stable and equal regime, allowing denominations to alternate between these powers after the creation of a Senate as stipulated in Article 22 of the Lebanese Constitution.

The presidency

Reducing the term of the president from six years (Article 49 of the Constitution) to four nonrenewable and non extendible years is imperative to implementing the principle of alternation of the presidency between the denominations. This ensures that no single denomination would monopolize a specific post for too long. The four-year mandate is more than enough to implement any program and to give the people the opportunity to decide whether to maintain this program or not. By reducing the mandate to four years, the parliamentary elections would coincide with the presidential elections.

The legislative power

Parliament’s ordinary session:

Articles 31 and 32 of the Constitution set the legal dates to hold a parliamentary session; other dates are considered void and in violation of the law. The House’s two ordinary periods stretch from the Tuesday following March 15 until the end of May and from the Tuesday following October 15 until the end of the year, provided the examining and voting on the budget take precedence over anything else.

This mean that MPs will not meet for more than 180 days per year to legislate and vote on the budget unless extraordinary sessions were called for.

First, with the increasing need to legislate and emphasize the quality of the laws, it is inconcevable to limit Parliament’s legislative work only to half year. There are draft laws and proposals lying in the drawers not for political reasons but for the impossibility of examining and voting on them from a practical point of view.

Second, limiting Parliament sessions to a relatively short period of time, and giving the president, with the premier’s consent, the authority to call for extraordinary House sessions by virtue of a decree setting the opening and closing date as well as the agenda (Article 33 of the Constitution), means limiting the mandate of the House in favor of the executive power. This is in violation of paragraph (c) of the Constitution’s preamble which clearly stipulates that "Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic."

Therefore it is suggested to amend Article 32 of the Constitution and adopt one ordinary session for the House, stretching from mid-October until mid-June. Such an amendment would contribute to making Parliament its own master.

Executive power

Separating Parliament from the Cabinet:

The principle of separating the legislative power from the executive power as provided for by the Constitution is not effectively implemented. Article 28 of the Constitution, which authorizes grouping the Parliament and Cabinet function, contradicts paragraph (e) of the Constitution’s preamble which stipulates that the regime is based on the principle of separation, balance and cooperation between the powers.

So how can the House hold Cabinet accountable when ministers are also MPs? Could it be both the accused and the judge?

Consequently, based on the principle of separation of powers which guarantees government’s performance, we believe the Cabinet and the House should be separated and therefore Article 28 of the Lebanese Constitution should be amended, and a mechanism regulating the vacancy of the positions of MPs who joined the Cabinet be included in the electoral law.

About urgent bill:

Article 58 of the Constitution stipulates that: "Every bill the Cabinet deems urgent and in which this urgency is indicated in the decree of transmission to the Parliament may be issued by the president of the Republic within 40 days following its communication to the House, after putting it on the agenda of a plenary meeting, reading it aloud before the House, and after the expiration of the time limit without the House acting on it."

Linking the 40-day deadline granted to the president to pass an urgent bill by Cabinet to the proviso of putting this bill on the agenda of the plenary meeting of the House and reading it aloud before the Assembly gives the House speaker the chance to maneuver and the possibility to hamper the implementation of this article by failing to raise the urgent bill on the agenda and consequently pushing further the 40-day deadline.

Based on the principle of balance and separation of powers, the House speaker should not be given this authority to hamper the Cabinet’s work. But, if the one-session principle is adopted, which stretches from mid-October to mid-June every year, then the plenary meetings would be held on a weekly basis throughout the year. Besides putting an urgent bill as soon as possible on the agenda becomes inevitable.

The governmental solidarity

The National Accord document (Taif) entrusted the executive power with the Cabinet (Article 65 of the Constitution) and Article 66 of the Constitution made the ministers collectively responsible before the House for the effects of general policy of the Government and made them individually responsible for their personal actions.

The practice gave the ministers the freedom to oppose the ministerial decisions and the Cabinet’s general policy, which destabilized the governmental solidarity and weakened the position of the prime minister, who coordinates with the ministers and gives general instructions to guarantee the well-functioning of public institutions and administrations (Article 64 of the Constitution).

For the sake of the governmental solidarity, which incarnates a unified political will and a coherent vision of the Cabinet’s orientation, the opposition ministers should voice their opposition from inside the Cabinet.

Any minister, who rejects the Cabinet’s general policy by publicly criticizing and objecting its practices, should resign or should be forced to resign.

The Cabinet cannot stay in power if it is divided and cannot be an arena for the loyalists and the opposition at the same time. It is true that Lebanon is a consensual democracy however this does not allow the executive power to turn into a forum for exchanging accusations between its members, otherwise there will be no such democracy.

Keeping the opposition ministers away from the government strengthens executive power and enhances both the opposition and the loyalists.

Setting a deadline for the prime minister to issue decrees

Article 56 of the Constitution set a time limit for the president to issue the laws and decrees to prevent him from stalling and hampering the work of the constitutional institutions. Article 64 of the Constitution did not set any deadline for the prime minister to issue these decrees, which encouraged the refusal to signing the decrees for political reasons and consequently hampering the work of the government and destabilizing the relations between the president and Parliament.

Thus, in order to restore balance between the three top politicians and guarantee the smooth running of the government, Article 64 of the Constitution should be amended by giving deadlines to the prime minister similar to the president’s to issue decrees.

Prosecuting the ministers

The Lebanese Constitution neither includes a document that defines "high treason," the "violation of the Constitution," or "failing to assume the duties," nor does it impose compliance with the Penal Code; knowing that the Law of Procedures before the Higher Council compelled this Council to abide by the principle of the legality of the crimes and the legality of sanctions stipulated by articles one and six of the Penal Code.

Consequently, in order to abide by Article 70 of the Constitution, it is necessary to include in the Law of Procedures before the Higher Council a text explaining the meaning of the minister’s failure to assume his/her duties so that the minister does not remain above the law.

The Constitutional Council

The Constitutional Council should be granted a mandate to review the constitutionality of the laws, according to a request of one of the legal parties before the State Council or the Cassation Court. This mandate should be preceded by a two-year period, during which Parliament accounts for the laws that might be unconstitutional. It is normal to entrust the constitutional council with the task of reviewing the constitutionality of the constitutional amendments and to safeguard the outstanding principles in the Constitution, which cannot be altered even in a constitutional amendment, like coexistence or consensual democracy, and these principles are called "supra-constitutional" in the constitutional law.

An interpretation of the Constitution by Parliament cannot produce mandatory effects unless this interpretation takes place through a legal text that respects the constitutional procedures stipulated by articles 76 and 77 of the Constitution.

Consequently, it is necessary to reconsider allowing the Constitutional Council to interpret the Constitution, since this mission does not conflict with the concept of sovereignty, especially as the theory of monitoring the constitutionality of laws is now adopted in most countries of the world.

The independence of the judiciary

Only Article 20 of the constitution governs judiciary power and it stipulates that: "Judiciary power is handled by all the courts within a system that is stipulated by the law and provides the judges and the plaintiffs with the necessary guarantees. The terms and limits of the judicial guarantee are set by the law. The judges are independent in performing their job while the decrees and decisions are issued by all the courts and implemented in the name of the Lebanese people."

While the Constitution stresses the independence of the judges, it does not mention any mechanism that guarantees this independence.

The National Accord document (Taif) noted this gap and tried to fill the void in paragraph (b) pertaining to the courts, and stated: "In order to enhance the independence of the judiciary: the judicial body elects a specific number of the members of the Higher Judicial Council."

However, this paragraph has not been put into effect yet. Criticism cannot be stopped as long as the judicial power remains dependent on the executive power.

Consequently, we call for the implementation of the part of the Taif Accord pertaining to the independence of the judiciary and we also propose that the Higher Judicial Council be granted the mandate to make the judicial appointments without referring to the executive power, which would give the general prosecutors and the judicial body total independence, absolving them of all suspicions. We also call for upgrading the judges’ social situation, which would encourage skilled individuals to join the judicial body and immunize them against bribery.

The Senate

Article 22 of the Lebanese Constitution states: "With the election of the first Parliament on a national basis and not on a sectarian basis, a new Cabinet should be created, in which all the spiritual families are represented and whose mandate is limited to critical issues." This article linked the creation of a Senate to the election of the first Parliament on a national, nonsectarian basis.

This link is illogical, because the creation of a Parliament on national basis could take dozens of years and is related to the prior presence of the Senate, which is a guarantee of moving from a sectarian Parliament to a national one.

The creation of a Senate would also resolve the issue of the representation of the Druze, Catholic and Orthodox denominations in the Lebanese pyramid, which will be formed of four powers: the president, the premier, the speaker and the Senate president.

The prerogatives of the Senate are summarized as follows:

1- The authority to veto every law that contradicts the principle of consensual democracy or co-existence and rights of the denominations.

2- Proposing laws, especially those related to the sectarian structure in Lebanon.

3- A second reading of the laws whereby the Senate has the right to return to Parliament provided that a two-thirds majority of its members (16 members as we will see later) vote for it. In this case, the House should adopt the law by its majority. If the president of the Republic requests to reconsider this law in accordance with Article 57 of the Constitution, then the House should adopt it with its two-thirds majority (after amending Article 57 of the Constitution). The Senate is composed of 22 members after the number of MPs in the House is reduced from 128 to 108 as was mentioned in paragraph six of the item on political reforms in the National Accord document.

The Senate members are distributed as follows:

Three Sunni representatives, three Shiite representatives, three Druze representatives and one Alawite representative (10 Muslims). Three Maronite representatives, two Catholic representatives, and two Greek Orthodox representatives, one Armenian Catholic representative, One Armenian Orthodox representative, and one representative for the Christian minorities (10 Christians). One representative for the Jews and one representative for the nonsectarian (22 altogether). Each sect elects Senate members who represent them and each voter has one vote (one man, one vote). Lebanon follows one electoral district and those who secure the largest number of votes possible from the voters within their sect for the seats allocated to this sect are considered successful.

Alternations in presidency and in positions among communities

What has offended the Lebanese structure the most was the domination by one sect of a given post for a permanent period. This made other sects feel they were treated unfairly. But their religious belonging hindered their chances of assuming a position. This is one of the reasons that weakened national identity and pushed the Lebanese people to take refuge behind their sectarian identities. It is difficult to change this reality especially after the country witnessed 15 years of war in the name of the weak and 15 years of struggle in the name of the marginalized people. The answer to resolving this sectarian reality lies in giving it guarantees so that it doesn’t turn to foreign countries, requesting protection from abroad, or to bloody internal fighting or division.

Religions communities in Lebanon are a fact that we have to acknowledge if we are to find a solution to the problems that the country has been suffering from ever since these communities existed. Therefore, terminating political sectarianism in Lebanon can’t be accomplished following the French approach that has begun to suffer from its shortcomings and restrictions.

Terminating political sectarianism in Lebanon definitely passes through alternations in presidencies and posts between the major communities (Maronites, Shiites and Sunnis) and the others (Druze, Catholics and Orthodox) to pave the way for other communities to be active and play their roles in order to achieve actual equality between the Lebanese people and to reinforce their national identity in lieu of pure religious belonging.

These alternations should be made every four years (duration of the mandate of the president and House speaker) according to the way defined in the attached table (the table is an example, which is why it does not tackle all posts in all ministries and administrations).

The philosophy of alternations, which should coincide with adopting the broad-based administrative decentralization stipulated in the Taif Accord, is to pave the way for all communities to actually participate in the essence of governance without any one sect being dominated by another or making the other communities feel they are marginalized. In this way, national identity is strengthened through the sectarian guarantees whereby each party feels that banking on foreign countries will not be more profitable than banking on Lebanon. During each governance session, alternation and change in posts, sects get used to dealing with each other on the basis of equality and complementarity and it becomes a motivation for peace without risk. Thus, each community should feel it is represented by a person who holds a leadership position in the four authorities and there is nothing wrong in that. As much as alternation secures national balance and equality among the Lebanese on "the Lebanese way" (that is much better than what is used today), the election of each community of its representative in the post of the presidency of the Republic or the Government or Parliament or Senate secures political stability that Lebanon has lacked since its independence.

There is no shame in having each community elect its "leader" at one point as long as it has the option after four years of re-electing its own leader this time to a different position. This would reinforce interaction and cooperation between all institutions.

Such system should stop these communities from turning to other countries. At the same time it limits the instinct that leans toward division because, by maintaining the unity of the country, each community is given its right to power, and the right to participate and express its specificities within the general mosaique. This doesn’t stop the candidates of a given sect wishing to hold one of these leading posts from cooperating with other candidates of other sects. Each one strives to win the confidence of there voters on the basis of a unified governance program where it is up to the people to decide an integrated ruling team on the basis of political and economic choices and not on the basis of instincts.

Sectarian strife under such a system can’t be justified especially after adopting a modern and fair law for parliamentary elections on the basis of proportionality and large historic muhafazat (provinces) that safeguards the rights of "nonsectarian individuals."

With reference to the table on the alternation of posts between the confessions every four years, the establishment of a Senate gives a fourth sect the opportunity to hold a post in Power.

This post was allocated to the Druze, but it is possible that even on this level, there would be an alternation every four years between the Druze, the Orthodox and the Catholics whereby each sect takes part in determining Lebanon’s fate on all levels.

In a quick reading of the typical table of the alternation of posts between the communities, we can see for example when the president of the Republic belongs to a given sect, Maronite or Sunni, the same sect is given the finance portfolio since it is the main ministry. That is done in order to compensate the modest powers of the president of the Republic compared with the other leaderships. Furthermore, the posts of minister of defense and director general of the Surete Generale are given to a person from the president’s community (Maronite, Sunni or Shiite, Druze, Catholic or Orthodox).

When the prime minister is a Druze or Shiite for example, his community can’t be given a major portfolio except for the Ministry of Justice to maintain the balance with the other communities due to the broad jurisdiction the premier enjoys although the Cabinet rules like an assembled commission. In this context, the ministry of public works and transport (the largest service provider ministry) can’t be given to someone who is from the community of the premier. The same is applicable to the post of the president of the Council for Development and Reconstruction. As for the post of the Internal Security Forces Commander, it is given to a person who is from the same denomination as the premier so that this denomination secures an advanced position among leaders of security apparatuses.

When the Speaker of the House is a Sunni or Catholic, for example, the foreign minister, the minister of education, the commander of the army, the president of the Council for Development and Reconstruction must be from his/her community. In this way, this denomination secures a position for foreign affairs, and other social, security and developmental positions.

The Senate, with the jurisdiction it has to legislate regarding issues such as co-existence, consensual democracy, and rights of confessions, is like a guarantee for a confession whose leader runs the ministry of the interior, the Lebanese University, and the Constitutional Council. These jurisdictions safeguard for this community the Public Works and Transport portfolio as a guarantee for development.

If the principle of alternation is applied, with its flaws, the major sects (Maronites, Shiites, and Sunnis) will have the chance to alternate the four presidencies between them in a complete cycle every 16 years with a different presidency for each of them every four years. This would also allow the sects (Druze, Catholics, and Orthodox) to take their turns in assuming these presidencies even for a longer period (once every eight years, meaning that every sects needs 32 years to alternate one complete session).

Isn’t this equation, with its defaults, much fairer than the equation that is currently adopted, wherey the Maronites dominate the post of the president of the Republic, and the Shiites dominate the post of the speaker of the House and the Sunni that of the prime minister and then they all quarrel over the jurisdictions and deny the other denominations their rights in shaping the history and future of Lebanon until they give up in frustration?

It is true that this system is not being fair to all the communities in Lebanon be it the Armenians, the Christian minorities or the Alawites. But it is a bold step on the way to eradicate political sectarianism stipulated in Article 95 of the Constitution.

When the largest number possible of communities take part in running this country, then their sense of national identity is reinforced, mutual distrust disappears and fears and concerns vanish.

Our apologies to all those who still dream of a day where all religions identities disappear in favor of national identity and then naively try to impose patriotism.

I can’t imagine the orient without religions or a society without minorities. Lebanon lies in the heart of this eastern part of the world and the Lebanese community is composed of large minorities of a sectarian nature. So why do we lie to each other? And why do we ignore each other or challenge each other? No one can eliminate the other or even live without the other. Our fates are linked to the fate of the community as a whole. That’s why we have to always picture modern systems that sponsor co-existence in a fair and modern manner. These systems should be tailored to Lebanon’s needs, they should be neither copied from foreign systems nor imposed on us. This alternation in the presidencies between the religious communities is an attempt to picture solutions to some of the challenges that are somehow difficult and that our societies are facing. This solution does not claim to be comprehensive and does not claim to be the perfect solution that I look forward to. It is a real attempt that stands in the face of the cycle of irrationality that is paralyzing our initiatives. Whoever believes that the "truth" in Lebanon is only to safeguard this constitutional equation (the charter and Taif Accord) is like a tourist riding in a taxi that has run out of gas and believes that he reached his destination!

So, to all those who are convening in the name of the dialogue and are aiming to reach a settlement, I urge you not to let this stage of our long national journey pass us by. Gather all your ideas and initiatives before the country burns down!

A sample of the alternation in posts between denominations every four years

Post	Denomination Responsible For 4 years	Denomination Responsible For 4 years	Denomination Responsible For 4 years	Denomination Responsible For 4 years
President of the Republic	Maronite	Orthodox	Shiite	Sunni
Prime Minister	Sunni	Maronite	Catholic	Shiite
Speaker of the Chamber	Shiite	Sunni	Maronite	Catholic
President of the Senate	Druze	Shiite	Sunni	Maronite
Foreign Minister	Shiite	Sunni	Maronite	Catholic
Interior Minister	Druze	Shiite	Sunni	Maronite
Finance Minister	Maronite	Druze	Shiite	Sunni
Justice Minister	Sunni	Maronite	Druze	Shiite
Defense Minister	Maronite	Catholic	Shiite	Sunni
Education Minister	Shiite	Sunni	Maronite	Orthodox
Public works and Transport Minister	Orthodox	Shiite	Sunni	Maronite
Constitutional Council	Druze	Shiite	Sunni	Maronite
Army Commander	Shiite	Sunni	Maronite	Orthodox
Director General of the Surete Generale	Maronite	Orthodox	Shiite	Sunni
ISF Commander	Sunni	Maronite	Druze	Shiite
Lebanese University	Maronite	Shiite	Sunni	Druze
Council of Development and Reconstruction	Shiite	Sunni	Maronite	Catholic